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ROMANTlCISM AND BEHAVIOR 
by 
Morse Peckham 
In discussing Romanticism it is still wise, I think, to begin by making as 
clear as I can what I propose to talk about. The word "Romanticism," as 
Lovejoy long ago pointed out, more than most terms used in cultural history, 
is particularly subject to polysemy. It is no longer very necessary to worry about 
the antithesis, once so common, between Romanticism and Classicism. Some 
people still worry about that, and it is still not uncommon to see the two terms 
thus juxtaposed. But on the whole it is now reasonably clear to most scholars 
and historians that when one uses Romanticism in an historical sense, it is 
quite unnecessary to bring in classicism. This is not to say that late 18th­
century Neo-Classicism can be pushed out of the picture when one is discussing 
the beginnings of Romanticism. Among literary historians, at least on this side 
of the Atlantic, and I think generally on the continent, Romanticism is thought 
of as a more or less clearly identifiable widespread cultural re-direction that 
begins to become observable in the course of the 1790's1 though not in the 
sense of a self-conscious movemenl, such as Futurism, for example. Among art 
historians, however, and social and political historinns and musicologists, the 
term continues to include historical phenomena which most literary historians 
no longer think of as Romantic. Social and political historians apparently con­
tinue to think of late 18th-century sentimentalism, utopianism, libertarianism, 
and anarchism as Roman tic phenomena, but to the literary historians-I think 
this is now generally the case-such attitudes are quite typically Enlightenment 
and can be traced to Enlightenment �umptions, against which Romanticism 
was a reaction, or, to put it more carefully, to the failure of which Romanticism 
was a response. Many art. historians look at the matter much as do these 
historians, a way that to 1literary historians is very old-fashioned. Art historians 
still tend to decide the issue on fairly simple iconographic grounds. Since there 
are storm pictures in the last couple of decades of the 18th century, and since 
they continued to be common well into the 19th century, they judge both 
periods to be Romantic. But there are storms and storms; the significant matter 
is not the subject but the way it is handled and the rest of the iconographic 
data to be found in the picture. Architectural historians have traditionally 
identified Romanticism with the revival of the Gothic; thus they trace Roman­
ticism in architecture haU-way back or more into the 18th century. Rut there 
is a great deal of difference between building a folly or villa or fake ruin in the 
Gothic style and building Gothic cathedrals and railway stations. The one is 
private, an amusement; the other is public, central to social life. Literary histori­
ans no longer think of Gothicism or Medievalism as a defining attribute of Ro­
manticism, the Gothic novel itself being judged as Enlightenment not Romantic. 
Their position is reasonably close to that of historians of philosophy, and that 
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branch of philosophical history known as the history of ideas has, of course, 
been of great importance in the development of the literary notion of 
Romanticism. But musicologists, who for reasons I cannot fathom seem to think 
that cultural re-directions in music occur thirty years after they occur in the 
other fields of art and also thought, tend to put the beginning of Romanticism 
about 1830. To the literary historian this is very odd. To be sure, he can grasp 
the early Beethoven as a typically late Enlightenment or late Neo-Classic com­
poser, but he also sees the kind of profound change overcoming Beethoven's 
music in the first decade of the century as the same kind of change as that which 
literature shows and also painting, for to him Ingres and Delacroix are equally 
Romantic. Indeed. Mozart's intense interest in Baroque music in the last couple 
of years of his life, particularly in Bach, suggests to one with the literary sense of 
Romanticism that had he lived he would have moved in the direction that 
Beethoven took, wouid have become a Romantic composer, so common in all 
the arts is the revival of Baroque in the early 1 9th century. 
In the present paper I shall be using the point of view developed in the last 
quarter of a century by literary historians, namely, that if one examines the 
production of a certain few European writers-and this term includes England as 
well-who were born in the years around 1770 one can discern a common pat­
tern of cultural re-direction; that that re-direction was repeated and continued 
by more and more writers born in subsequent years; and that cultural changes 
since then have been, in spite of a great many changes and varieties, a con­
tinuation of that innovative culture which began to emerge in the 1790's and by 
1800 is clearly identifiable. In this assertion that high-level emergent culture is 
still Romantic I am in disagreement with a good many of my colleagues. who 
prefer to see Romanticism ending in the course of the 1820's. For my part I 
feel that the identification of certain early Romantic cultural patterns makes it 
impossible not to see that these same patterns still obtain, and that the problems 
of the early Romantics can be explained in a language which is equally appro­
priate today. Before identifying that pattern, however, and before relating i t  to a 
more general explanation of human behavior, it will be necessary to bring forth 
certain assumptions and make them as clear as I can. 
I 
The first of these has to do with history itself. What are we doing when we 
compose an historical discourse? Can it be said that we are writing about events? 
Historians certainly act as if they think so, and frequently they say so. But if 
we take the trouble to watch what they are actually doing, to observe their be­
havior, it is apparent that they are doing nothing of the sort. They are '¥riting 
about documents and artifacts, and only if t.his is grasped can it be seen that 
historiography has in any sense a scientific character. A great deal has been 
written about order in history, but such efforts always remain unresolved, and 
for a very simple reason. The regularity and the causal relationships said to be 
found in history are not a feature of history itself but of historical discourses. 
The regularity and the causality are attributes of the verbal behavior of 
historians, not of historical events, which are obviously inaccessible. Though it 
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seems reasonable enough to say that there has been what we call history, at least 
reasonable enough to justify historical effort, nevertheless historical events 
cannot be observed. All that can be observed is documents and artifacts. 
This puts the historian in an awkward position and seems to deprive him of 
all claim to a scientific justification for his enterprise. But the picture, though 
gloomy enough, is not so gloomy as that. There are sufficient similarities 
between the behavior of the historian and the behavior of the physical scientist 
to give the historian at least some respectability, assuming, of course, that the 
activity of the physical scientist is the best model for the acquisition of what we 
call knowledge. I believe this to be the case, for the behavior of the physical 
scientist, in its pattern and its results, is the behavior of all men in their dealings 
with the observable and non-verbal world. The behavior of an Indian propelling 
his canoe through the rapids is not fundamentally different from that of the 
atomic physicist in his laboratory. To be sure, the behavior of the physicist is an 
enormous elaboration of that basic behavior of a man dealing with the world, 
and the most striking difference is verbal, the immensely complex verbal 
responses or explanations of what he has observed. But even that is but an elab­
oration of the simple sentence, "If you do so-and-so, such-and-such will be the 
consequence-probably." And such simple sentences are the verbal foundation of 
both canoeing and atomics. They are at what, a little carelessly, I call the 
empirical frontier of language. 
Like the scientist, the historian is also engaged in the construction of elab­
orate verbal explanations. In this they are alike, but what is the historian's 
verbal frontier? Does he, indeed, have any? From one point of view, yes, he 
does. In the "If . . . then . .  , " sentence above, the inclusion of "probably" is of 
the greatest possible importance. Only that can be explained which exhibits 
regularity and recurrence. The totally random is beyond explanation. Hence, 
for example, it is scientific doctrine that an experiment must be repeatable 
before anything can be done with it. Redundancy of information is the 
condition of scientific behavior. I myself think there is something a little dubious 
about this doctrine and this notion of scientific condition, but at least it does 
seem to be the case that any behavior can be stabilized only by repetition of 
that activity , and that the condition of that stabilization is redundancy of in­
formation, or, more precisely, comprehensible instructions for response. In 
short, though I believe it to be the case that the foundation of scientific 
behavior is the repeatability of experiment and observation, I would put the 
emphasis not on the repetition of either but on lthe repetition of the scientist's 
behavior. He accepts the reliability of an observation because he can repeat his 
response to the observed when he judges that he has encountered another in­
stance of it. This is why innumerable repetitions of what are judged to be the 
same observations or the same experiments never produce absolute certainty. 
Hence, it is always wise to include "probably" in "If . . .  then . . .  " sentences, 
for "probability" introduces statistics, and statistics is a behavioral strategy 
for extracLing regulariLy from the random. When the carpenter says to his 
apprentice, "You have to be careful in sawing this kind of wood, because knots 
can turn up at any point, and most unexpectedly," he is saying that the 
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occurrence of knots is not random but only approximately predictable. In the 
same way my own guess is that the Rhine experiments in ESP reveal the 
limitations of contemporary statistics, a possibility that seems to me to have 
been insufficiently explored. For that reason we are not yet in a position to 
say that there is such a phenomenon as extra-sensory perception, though there 
very well may be. I merely wish to emphasize that statistics is, after all, some­
thing that human beings do; it does not necessarily reveal the laws of the 
universe. 
Regularity or the occurrence of the non-random, then is the basis for the 
enterprise of scientific behavior, of which the construction of explanation is a 
part. In what sense can il be said that the historian is also engaged in non-random 
behavior and thus is engaged in scientific behavior? The patterned recurrence to 
be found in his explanatory constructs means nothing, because that is the 
characteristic of all explanatory constructs, including those of the wildest 
occultism. The question is, what kind of "If . . .  then . . .  " sentence can lead 
him beyond the empirical frontier of his explanations? It is only there that any 
recurrence and regularity , any non-randomness, of scientific significance is to be 
found. If we pay attention to what the historian responds to, the answer is 
easy enough. The non-randomness which is the occasion for the recurrence in 
the historian of similarity of response is the distribution on the face of the 
earth o!f documents and artifacts. Documents pertaining to English history are 
more probably to be found in England than in Tibet, and the probability is in· 
creased if the documents antedate the English penetration of Tibet. Or, "If you 
go to such-and-such a place, then you will find instances of such-and-such 
categories of documents and artifacts, probably ." If history had never been 
written, this possibility of statistical control would make it possible to write it. 
Does the physicist do anything more? There is at least an apparent difference. 
The physicist, it is affirmed, can, after he has located phenomena which he 
judges to be recurrent, perform experiments which verify his explanations. 
The historian, after all, is limited by the interpretation of the content, or 
meaning, of his documents and artifacts. He is involved in the hermeneutic 
problem .  How can an interpretation be verified, except by other documents and 
artifacts, which, however, also are subject to exactly the same kind of hermeneu­
tic limitation? The historian is confined to the interpretation of verbal and non­
verbal man-made semiotic configurations. This, it seems, is not the limitation of 
the physicist. But is this actually the case? What does the physicist do? What is 
his behavior? Briefly, his observation, like all observation, such being the nature 
of perception, is selective; further, his judgement of recurrence depends upon 
categorization, and categorization is a human activity. He judges that two phe­
nomenal configurations are sufficiently similar to be placed, for his purposes, 
in the same category. His behavior is thus conventionalized, and he too is en­
gaged in hermeneutics, for his activity is based upon interpretation of what he 
has observed. His act of experimental verification is, moreover, just as bound up 
with interpretation as the historian's verification of interpretation by turning to 
other documents and artifacts. From this point of view, then, the historian is on 
as sound a footing as the physical scientist. Neither can arrive at certainty. 
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Nevertheless, there is a difference, one that increases greatly the degree of 
uncertainty as we move from the physical sciences to historiography. It is not 
that the scientist is involved with the present and the historian with the past, for 
the historian is not involved with the past. He is engaged in hermeneutic 
response to documents and artifacts. His chronological ordering of those docu­
ments and artifacts is itself a construct and filled with uncertainty, even though 
chronology is the closest the historian can ever come to certainty. Chronology 
is the pre-condition of all his activities. Furthermore, the making of artifacts is 
itself under verbal control. Directly or indirectly the historian is responding to 
verbal behavior, and moreover to verbal behavior abstracted from the situation 
in which it came into existence. The very survival of documents and artifacts 
evinces a randomness which is impenetrable, and this is a kind of randomness 
with which the physical scientist is not faced. Among scientists only the 
evolutionary theorist is exposed to the same impenetrable randomness in the 
survival of his observables that is the condition of the historian. For other 
scientists the selection of the observables is susceptible to innovation, but for 
the historian that selection has already taken place, and there is nothing he can 
do about it. This necessarily in�reases his uncertainty over that of the scientist. 
But even this is not the gravest distinction between the two. The scientist can 
modify his explanations by negative feedback. Not verification but falsification 
is what keeps the scientist going. The occasion of that falsification is the 
manipulation of the non-verbal. Such manipulation results in re-categorization, 
re-interpretation, and innovative explanation. The historian, on the other hand, 
confined to the verbal or that which is controlled by the verbal, has no such 
recourse. His re-interpretation of his observables does not arise from negative 
feedback but from modification of his explanation. Thus historiography pro­
ceeds by the discovery of new documents, by a hermeneutic which makes judge­
ments of incoherence, and by developing new explanatory modes. But above all 
it proceeds by a hermeneutic assertion of the recurrence of statements or groups 
of statements sufficiently similar to each other to justify categorizing them as 
modes of the same statement, that is, by subsuming these documentary state­
ments under a statement which, controlled by his explanation, he has generated. 
Thus the difference between the physical scientist and the historian is that the 
latter spends most of his efforts in verbal behavior, while the former is con­
stantly engaged in a behavioral interaction with the non-artifactual world, an 
interaction, moreover, which unlike that of the historian involves a modification 
of his own manipulative behavior. Hence the scientist is constantly engaged in an 
activity like that of crossing the street in heavy traffic, while the historian 
rarely if ever has the occasion to modify his physical behavior. Thus the 
instrumental or directional character of scientific theory is fairly obvious, but 
the corresponding verbal constructs of the historian are far more easily hypos­
tatized, and the normative and fictive character of those constructs far more 
easily ignored. 
The traditional straightforward historian is principally engaged in the con­
struction of a narrative made up of event statements. As we have seen, his 
first problem is chronological; and this is certainly the basis of the cultural 
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historian as well, but the latter asserts that he is engaged in constructing a 
narrative of mental events, or ideas, or the manifestation of those ideas in works 
of art and similar artifacts, such as, for example, instances of historical discourse. 
But mental events, even if there are such things, are not accessible, even at the 
present, let alone in the past. What he means by mental events are in fact state­
ments found in documents and exemplified in non-verbal artifacts, though to be 
sure he often has a difficult problem in finding a statement to go with, or 
explain, an artifactual exemplification, a statement, moreover, which must be 
close enough chronologically to justify the assertion that the statement and tbe 
exemplification properly go together. For my immediate purposes I shall 
restrict myself to statements found in documents. 
The cultural historian proceeds, then, by observing the recurrence of certain 
key terms and statements of an abstract or high explanatory character, and also 
by categorizing differing terms and statements as exemplifications of various 
explanatory terms and statements. The latter behavior inc�eases the frequency 
of the recurrence that depends upon and thus facilitates enormously his 
activity. However, there is a difficulty here, and it is the difficulty found in the 
usual practice of the history of ideas. The recurrence of a term or statement, or 
the recurrence of his own explanatory terms which subsume somewhat different 
terms and statements, does not necessarily mean that the historian is justified 
in his procedure. The recurrence of even identical terms or statements is a 
consequence of the historian's act of categorial judgement, an act which is 
carried out by verbal behavior. How does he know that the individual who made 
a particular utterance-a statement or a term-would make the same judgement 
of categorial subsumption that the historian makes? The fact is that the 
historian can be reasonably sure that individual in question would not have made 
the same subsumptional judgement, and the explanation of why he would not is 
indeed the subject of cultural history. However, the fact that at different times 
different explanations are given of the same recurrent explanatory terms does 
not necessarily mean that the differing regressive explanations are necessarily 
dissimilar, though they might be. The question is whether or not such differing 
explanations belong to the same family of explanations. To be sure, this involves 
further and more regressive explanatory subsumption, and so on in what 
promises to be an infinite explanatory regress. The problem, then, is to stop that 
regress at what, following this line of reasoning, might be called the family level. 
Thus, if the family is epistemological the question is whether or not the state­
ment or term in question properly is subsumed by an epistemological statement 
and if this statement can appropriately be subsumed by one of the various 
styles of epistemological theories available to the historian. 
Even so, however, the family question is more complex than that, for such a 
solution makes available only those epistemological theories available in the 
historian1s own cultural situation, but his problem is to determine whether or 
not, for example, the statements and terms in question are properly subsumed 
under an epistemological theory no longer available. My assumption is rather 
that a more adequate circumscription of a family of explanations is best deter­
mined by the recurrenc.e not of single statements or individual terms but rather 
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by the recurrence of families of terms and statements. Yet at this point the 
metaphor of families begins to lose its value, because the relationship of the 
terms is by no means immediately apparent. "Family" must be used in a very 
loose sense so that the observation of the recurrence of such terms or statements 
must be prior to the effort to show the family relationship. On the other hand, 
the attempt to establish a family relationship has a dialectical relationship to the 
observation of the recurrence. Moreover, as I shall attempt subsequently to show 
in the notion of Romanticism, one can assume quarrels within the family, or 
even familial adoption, the effort to yoke together terms and statements which 
in the course of time are revealed to be incompatible. This last notion is 
particularly useful, for the dynamics of explanation emerges from the judge­
ment of an incoherence and the effort to re-structure the explanation so that 
the incoherent factor is either made coherent or is eliminated. An example may 
be found in the very history of the effort to define or circumscribe the notion 
of Romanticism, that is, by the coherent subsumption of various terms and 
statements under a single term, "Romanticism," or under a set of familial terms 
and statements themselves subsumed by the term "Romanticism." The term I 
have in mind is "nature." For a long time an approving attitude towards the 
natural world was held to be a mark of Romanticism. There was much talk 
about the Romantic "return to nature." Thus it came about that any pre-19th­
century approving attitude toward nature was judged to be Romantic. Even a 
great scholar, Marjorie Nicholson, was misled into thinking that since Anglo­
Saxon poets indicate that there is a positive value in an approving attitude 
toward nature, Romanticism is peculiarly English . Gradually, however, it was 
·judged that the 18th-century attitude to nature was somehow different from the 
19th; thus the term "pre-romanticism" came into use. The next step was to 
decide, as I believe most students have now decided, that there is a striking 
difference between the 18th-century-Enlightenment attitude and 19th-century­
Romantic attitude, although as the continued popularity of The Seasons 
indicates, the Enlightenment attitude certainly persisted, and indeed continues 
to persist at the present time, side by side with the very different Romantic atti­
tude. To use the present terminology, it was concluded that the two uses of 
"nature" belong to quite different families of terms or statements. With this 
instrument of analysis it is possible to observe in Wordsworth the effort to dis· 
entangle the two ways of responding to nature and of responding to the word 
"nature" itself, a shift from judging that nature and the word are univalent 
to judging them as ambivalent. Considering the richness of European explana­
tory culture by the end of the 18th century and the semantic shifts the terms 
and statements central to the culture underwent in the course of the 19th 
century, it is not surprising that the writings of people we call Romantics show 
considerable internal incoherence, nor that historians of Romanticism are per­
plexed and get strikingly different results when they attempt to construct a 
coherent explanation of Romanticism. 
From these considerations I propose several further assumptions from which 
to proceed. First is that the perception or judgement of an incoherence in what 
has been held to be a coherent explanation is the result of some traumatic event, 
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such as Kant's reading of Hume or the development of the French Revolution, 
in the judgement of at least a few of its contemporaries, into an increasingly 
brutalized military dictatorship. Or, to take a case from my own experience, I 
was so traumatized by what seemed to me the hopeless incoherence of Romantic 
theory in the 1920's and 1930's that I have been unable to free myself o f  the 
problem. A second assumption is the nation of cultural stratification. Thus, at 
the present time a small minority of individuals in the European culture area 
construct explanations of some phenomena in what I judge to be the Romantic 
tradition. A far greater number construct explanations in the Enlightenment 
tradition. The youthful rebels of the 1960's made observations and explanations 
in the tradition of the late Enlightenment; almost all regressive justifications of 
their judgements, as well as their observations, can be found in Schiller's 
Kabale und Liebe, but virtually nothing in the conclusions of Senancour's 
Obermann. Bible-belt Baptists, however, explain in a style which long antedates 
the Enlightenment. In any given document, moreover, various strata may appear 
side by side, or even in the same sentence. This is the explanation for cultural 
incoherence and lies behind the dynamics of the efforts to resolve that in· 
coherence. 
A third assumption is that of cultural transcendence, the recognition of an 
innovative style of explanation. No member of a family is necessarily innovative; 
rather, the family as a family, or pattern, or syndrome, is innovative. Here the 
cultural historian runs into further difficulties, for a cultural innovation of 
several hundred years ago may appear to be platitudinous, since he is much later 
in the same cultural tradition and since by his time so many of the incoherences 
have been eliminated. Further, with this instrument of analysis the problem of 
periodization can be greatly simplified. A fourth assumption is that of cultural 
convergence, which depends upon the observation that various individuals may 
arrive at a similar or virtually identical cultural transcendence without any 
knowledge of each other, without cultural contamination or influence or 
dependency. 
Finally, for me none of this can be convincing unless it can be explained and 
justified by an explanatory system which has nothing to do with cultural 
history, that is, by a theory of human behavior which, though itself necessarily 
a part of cultural history, is not derived from cultural history, even though it 
may be demonstrated that it derives from the explanatory style the emergence 
of which and the character of which it purports to explain. I can scarcely here 
present a full theory of behavior, a theory which I am currently engaged in 
writing, but something of it will emerge in what follows. At any rate, though 
its ultimate explanatory regress I myself judge to be in the Romantic tradition, 
nevertheless it is derived not from that, at least not directly, but at best in· 
directly from an observation of human behavior controlled by certain explana­
tory sentences which I see as having been led to by what I call Romanticism but 
which are, nevertheless, very different from the Romantic beginnings. 
II 
I suggested above that possible alternatives to lhe notion of family are pattern 
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and syndrome, and the last is particularly appealing, because of its Freudian 
associations, Freud himself being very directly in the Romantic tradition; the 
syndrome of his own explanations is a pseudo- psychologization of much of 
Romantic German Idealism. However, this Freudian association does not make 
it appealing to me, for I find Freudian theory as intellectually unacceptable as I 
find contemporary academic professional behaviorism. Further, the notion of 
syndrome, like that of pattern, is excessively static, and both terms seem to 
imply an immanent or inlherent coherence, a coherence far from the notion of 
family. For a family is always changing; a family is still a family even if some 
members of it are absent or have not yet appear1..d; and, as I suggested above, a 
family can include by adoption or illegitimacy members which are subsequently 
discovered to be alien to it, just as a family can reject various of its members, 
delegitimatize them, as it were, or disinherit them, assert that they do not belong 
and never have. Now the Romantic family, the terms which to me can subsume 
with considerable success most of the term- and statement-members of the 
family to be found in those writers and artists we call Romantic, is made up of 
the following not necessarily coherent terms, though most of them are: 
explanatory collapse, alienation, isolation, the antithesis of role and self, 
cultural transcendence, redemption, anti-redemption, and epistemological ten­
sion. To these terms I shall attempt to give a behavioral explanation. 
Explanatory collapse was the traumatic experience to which over and over 
again Romanticism has been the emergent response, not merely around 1800 
but ever since. Cultural stratification can explain how this can have been so, for 
an individual can move from a more historically regressive stratum of explanation 
to a more recent emergent stratum at any time after the newer stratum has 
become culturally available. Assuming that Romanticism was a break with a 
collapsing explanatory system, it' is obvious that in the beginning the collapse 
affected only a tiny number of individuals in the European cultural area. By 
1800 there were only a couple of dozen that we can be reasonably sure of, if 
that many, though judging by bits of evidence here and there,, there were many 
more who left no record, who were neither artists nor philosophers nor theo­
logians. The number of individuals who have had that experience has grown 
steadily since, a growth aided by the inroads of Romanticism into the general 
culture. Thus the collapse in the course of time has come to be precipitated in 
two ways, one, like the collapse of the first Romantics, autonomously, and one 
from exposure to Romantic documents and non-verbal works of art, that is, 
from exposure to Romantic propaganda, my position being that all art is 
ideologically controlled and might as well be callied ideological propaganda. 
Explanatory collapse is by no means an uncommon experience. Psychiatrists 
encounter it quite often, It can be the collaps,e of a fairly simple explanatory 
mode, one that affects only a small but crucial area of the individual's behavior 
and leaves other areas intact. Thus the quite common sudden appearance of 
sexual adventurism in an individual's life, or of heavy drinking, or the sudden 
and emergent pursuit of a hobby like target-shooting, or hunting, or building 
model railways, is often preceded by an unanticipated and explained or, to the 
individual concerned, unjustified defeat in the social hierarchy in which he earns 
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his living, a dismissal from his job, or a failure to be promoted, or the transfer 
to a position of lesser status with his economic institution. Such an experience 
can be traumatic, even though on Sundays and when asked by poll-takers the 
individual continues to be a believing Methodist. His explanatory grasp of his 
economic life is not perceived or judged to be in any way connected with his 
social trauma. If such a connection is seen, the explanatory collapse may well 
involve and bring down his Christian beliefs. 
A similar trauma can be the collapse of erotic life, and by eroticism I mean 
not sexual behavior but that peculiar cognition of a woman, a man, or an old 
shoe which invests that object with the power to elicit from the individual a 
total resolution of tensions, a paradisaical state of being. Now explanation itself 
is a resolution of judgemental incoherence, and the tension that judgemental 
incoherence elicits. I do not mean that explanation and eroticization of exper­
ience are identical, but that they are similar in their tension-resolving capacity. 
Explanation resolves incoherence, but eroticization eliminates it. Certainly, 
how�ver, if one wishes to use such a word as "cognitive," a word I do not 
particularly care for, both are cognitive modes. Eroticism is thus remarkably 
similar to religious experience, and indeed whether we call eroticism a mode of 
religious apprehension, or religious apprehension a mode of eroticism, makes, so 
far as I am concerned, little difference. It is merely a question of which mode 
one prefers to use to explain the other. In any case both erotic and religious 
conversion, by avoiding or circumventing explanatory incoherence, are invariably 
described as granting to the converted an extraordinary sense of the value. of 
their own existence, while, of course, the object of the apprehension is said to 
be the cause of that experience of value, and the converted describe them­
selves, that is, their experience of their own value, as dependent upon the 
object. Explanation works much the same way; the resolution of verbal in­
coherence, whether by what is claimed to be a logical process, or by a leap of 
faith, not that there is  much difference, is so often described in language appro­
priate to religious or erotic conversion that it seems reasonable to describe it 
also as a mode of conversion. And· like conversion, the result is the sense of the 
explainer's value and the ascription of value to the world, though more accurate­
ly it is an ascription of value to the hypostatized explanatory language, 
accompanied by the same dependence upon that language. Thus Tennyson could 
describe ihimself as having abandoned belief in all theological utterances except 
for the proposition that the soul is immortal. Without that, he said, he could not 
continue to live. In the same way in popular songs the whining lover sings to a 
music of whines that without his beloved life is impossible. Furthermore, the 
more metaphysical the ,explanation, the more removed it is from the observable 
world by successive explanatory regressions, the greater the dependence upon it, 
for the more remote it is, the greater the number of sentences it is capable of 
subsuming, and the greater number of lower .. Jevel explanatiions it is capable of 
organizing. Men will die for faith, explanations, and love, including that 
eroticization of self known as honor. It is curious how interchangeable is the 
language of each of these modes of conversion; the lover feels himself redeemed 
by his love, the insulted man redeems his honor in a duel; a metaphysic is seen 
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as capable of redeeming the world, though actually it can only redeem verbal 
behavior, and faith redeems the soul. A verbal statement of any kind of con­
version, then, I shall call the redemptive mode, or more simply the redemptive, 
while a rejection of the validity of any kind of conversion I shall call the anti­
redemption. 
From this point of view explanatory collapse can be understood as a mode of 
de-conversion, the effect of which is quite the contrary to explanatory con­
version, for it is the judgement of incoherence in an explanation once seen as 
coherent, and the consequent loss of the power of explanations to resolve 
tensions and therefore the loss of value both to the verbal construct and to the 
de-converted himself. Religious and erotic de-conversion, however, tends to have 
consequences strikingly different from those of explanatory de-conversion. In 
the redemptive state of the former the attention and the interest are directed to 
states of being, internal conditions, and this attention and interest are con­
comitants of the circumvention of explanatory incoherence. But in the ex­
planatory de-conversion the effect is to turn the interest of the de-converted out­
side of the state of being, and beyond language to the non-verbal world. The 
explanation for this is that language, like all culture, is, when considered from a 
behavioral point of view, directions for performance. The language of religion 
and eroticism, circumventing as they do explanatory incoherence, are directions 
for manipulating states of being, that is, for manipulating what is inside the 
skin, to produce a tension-free or paradisaical internal weather. The language of 
explanation, however, arises initially from the judgement of incoherence in the 
world outside of the skin or in the world inside the skin when what is inside the 
skin is judged to be neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different from what 
lies outside of it. Explanatory lilnguage consists of directions for dealing with 
the world. The collapse of explanation, therefore, tends to lead to an 
explanation-free exploration of the non-verbal. Thus the man who has lost 
his job turns to sexual adventurism, Wordsworth turns to an examination of the 
dimensions of ponds, and the scientist whose theory has failed him turns to the 
random manipulation of his instruments. Erotic and religious de-conversion, to 
be distinguished from the collapse of an explanation couched in the terms of 
theological rhetoric, leads to a quasi-psychotic inability to act, while explanatory 
de-conversion leads to naively empirical exploration of some segment or calt!­
gory of the non-verbal, which can be either natural or man-made. The initial 
effect of Wordsworth's explanatory collapse or de-conversion was a lengthy con­
centration upon mathematics, something he judged to be metaphysically neutral, 
a non-verbal set of signs free from verbal explanation. 
The explanatory collapse to which Romanticism was a response was the 
collapse of an epistemology, though, to be sure, it was not always presented in 
that mode. Rather, since epistemological rhetoric is the explanatory mode 
most regressive from the non-verbal and non-artifactual, it can be used to sub· 
sume other manifestations, and · of course virtually all of the principal Romantic 
figures were directly interested in epistemology . At the end of the 18th century 
two epistemological modes were culturally available, idealism and empiricism, 
though of course these were available in a great variety of epistemological 
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rhetorics. Using an old-fashioned terminology, the idealistic position, the older 
one, the explanatory stratum first laid down, was that the categories of the 
subjecl can exhaust the attributes of the object, while the more recent one, 
which had gradually been emerging for several centuries, was that the cate­
gories of the object can exhaust the attributes of the subject. Preferring as I do a 
behavioral rhetoric, I would put the epistemological problem thus: What hap­
pens between the input of sensory data and the output of semiotic behavior, or 
the production of non-verbal and verbal signs? Is semiosis isomorphic with the 
sensory data to which it is a response? or is it not? And if it is not, how can we 
know whether it is or not? Or is this the wrong question? And if so, what is the 
right one? We do seem to be able to cross a heavily-trafficked street in the 
middle olf a block, but then on the other hand we sometimes get run over. We 
can be reasonably certain, to be sure, that perception itself, of any kind, selects, 
simplifies, organizes and! constructs, but then on the other hand we can be equal­
ly certain that that activity is modified by perceptual experience itself. The 
questjon is, then, can the disparity or tension between sensory input and semiosis 
be resolved by an explanation, or not? 
In these terms the older epistemology, the Platonistic-Christian tradition, 
asserts that the disparity can be resolved by an explanation which ascribes ulti­
mate validity to semiosis, or lhe subject, while the newer empirical-Enlighten­
ment tradition asserts that it can be resolved by an explanation which ascribes 
ultimate validity to the sensory input, or the object. In the course of the 18th 
century, most strikingly in Hume, skepticism re-emerged, a more powerful 
skepticism than the ancient variety, for the issues had become much clearer. It 
amounted to an explanatory demonstration that empiricism, the judgement that 
the object determines the subject, is, after all, a judgement of the subject. It is 
we who say that the world determines us, not, after all, the world that says so. 
This was devastating, not in itself, but because the newer epistemology had 
emerged in response to a judgement of incoherence in the old. The new 
skepticism thus asserted that the newer epistemology, far from being an anti­
thesis or correction of the old, was merely another form of it, just as the 
collapse of the values of the French Revolution led to the perception that 
Revolutionary Utopianism, the illusion of Absolute Freedom, as Hegel called it, 
was no more than a secularization of the Christian Heaven. This meant that the 
failure of the French Revolution, its degeneration into a brutal and militaristic 
dictatorship, was not merely a political failure but an epistemological failure. It 
was a failure of the ultimate explanatory modes of European culture. Nor was 
skepticism a possibility, though a good many Romantics tried it, for, as Kant 
and others came to realize, skepticism is itself a judgement of the subject, and in 
the way of skepticism lay, as once again Kant and others realized, the already 
impressive accomplishments of the physical sciences, or natural philosophy. Of 
the vast array of efforts to get out of this dilemma, to restructure one's relation 
to the world, in response to this trauma of explanatory coUapse, made crucial 
though nut iniliated by the failure of the French Revolution, it is impossible to 
speak here. It would involve, indeed, a history of 19th and 20th-century ex­
planatory culture and its exemplification in art and science. Nevertheless, the 
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thrust of these efforts can, I believe, be subsumed in small compass. But first it 
is necessary to speak of the consequences and the great significance of that 
trauma of ·explanatory collapse. 
Romantic literature is filled with wanderers. They are alienated from their 
society and they are isolated from contact with their fellow human beings. How 
can this be explained? The first important factor is what the wanderers are 
actually engaged in doing. Their wandering is search behavior, and this is 
indicated by what is judged to be a successful outcome, the consummation of 
the search, the arrival at a new integration, an innovative mode of redemption, 
though the nature of that redemption is currently the central problem of the 
theory of Romanticism, and to it I must return. This search character of their 
wandering is particularly salient in Alastor, for in that work there is no con­
summation, no goal is reached. To use what I have already presented, this 
wandering is the common response of explanatory collapse, and indeed sexual 
adventurism, as in Don Juan, and in Byron's and Shelley's own lives, and in the 
lives of a great many continental Romantics, was commonplace enough in 
Romanticism, just as it is today in the lives of middle-class suburbanites who 
lose their jobs or suffer hierarchical humiliation, or who, having achieved the 
goals of their youth, are without goals. The v.alues by which they live are no 
longer effective, but for the greater Romantics those values were the values of 
epistemological rhetoric, which explained and justified and validated all other 
values. Only a wandering search over the face of the earth, all of Europe, or 
much of Asia and America-only this search could adequately symbolize the 
devastation of the trauma they had experienced. Indeed, when you start 
counting up, it is instructive to observe how many of them were exiles from the 
lands of their own origin. . 
The explanation for this searching is that for individuals who are accustomed 
to having. their goals determined for them by a highly regressive explanatory 
rhetoric, on,tological and epistemological, an explanatory collapse leaves them 
with no resources for goal-setting and decision-making, leaves them without 
verbal directions for behavioral performance. Although I can scarcely justify 
my next step here, it is my position that the principal output of human energy 
goes into the limitation of the range of behavior. A goal, an interest, a purpose 
in life, a hobby; a faith,  a drug, a scholarly problem, falling in love, are all 
strategies for limiting the range of behavior, for placing in within as narrow 
limits as possible the activity of decision-making, that is, freedom. Further, 
the more regressive the explanatory collapse, the more extensive the range of 
the search behavior. The ordinary sexual wanderer has the range of his wandering 
limited by the value-belief that sexual prowess is the perfect symbolization of 
aggressive adequacy, but for the Romantic for whom explanatory collapse 
involved the inability to control his behavior by any of the ultimately regressive 
European values, the search behavior approached and sometimes arrived at a 
randomizat.ion of behavior, symbolized by the enormous geographical area 
covered by so many of the Romantic literary wanderers. The consequence is 
large-scale alienation. The humiliated suburbanite is scarcely able to aliena.te him­
self from his income-producing institution, but he can, with a little effort, 
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alienate himself from his marriage. But the large-scale alien is alienated from all 
values, that is, all behavior-limiting, decision-making cultural direction&, at 
least those that are dependent upon high-level explanatory regression. But 
often enough, as the Romantic documents show, even eating and sleeping are 
seriously disturbed. 
This leads to a complex of Romantic motives, a sub-family, to carry out 
the metaphor I have been using, of Romantic factors: alienation, cultural 
vandalism, and selfhood, or the distinction between self and role. I have been 
talking about the Romantic "self" for a great many years, but I have always 
wondered what it is that I have been talking about. If language, as I believe, is 
instructions for performance, and one of the performances it instructs us to do 
is to look for something, what does the word "self" instruct us to look for? 
Many years ago I judged that there was a connection between the negative or 
wandering stage of Romantic emergence and the self, but what that connection 
was I could not grasp. Now I believe it to be the case that what we look for 
when we judge "self" to be instructions for observation is negational behavior, 
and this also explains the phenomena of alienation and cultural vandalism. 
I do not use "vandalism" idly. This stage of Romanticism may be examined 
today in apparently pointless vandalism by young men and women who have 
been well brought up in middle-class homes. Such vandalism, including 
occasionally murder, is by no means pointless. If all behavior is adaptational, it 
is an attempt to control the environment for what is judged to be the benefit of' 
the individual. 'l'hus all acts are aggressive. Even perception, since it is selective 
and structuring, is an act of aggression, while what we call submission is con­
cealed .aggression oi: seduction. If you cannot control another human being 
directly you can trap him, you can disarm him by submission. It is the standard 
and universal strategy at all but the top level in any hierarchy, even in the 
constantly shifting hierarchy of marriage. The consequence of this aggressiveness 
is that the most explosive condition for the individttal is the feeling of help· 
lessness, the feeling that he has no aggressive control over his environmental 
situation. or the strategics open to him, psychotic col lapse into inactivity, 
suicide, or symbolic aggression, all may be found in the history of Romanticism. 
Symbolic vandalism is no less real for being symbolic. I call it symbolic because 
the vandalism is performed under circumstances from which the possibilities 
of retaliation by others is absent. Empty houses are splendid targets for 
adolescent vandalism. What vandalism produces in the individual is a powerful 
sense o f  selfhood, of being a man, and his own man; it is that sense of sudden 
glory which Hobbes called the result of the aggressive act of laughtei:. The "I" is 
opposed to "they," and not the "I" but the "they" are the victims. 
Now the typical adolescent vandal, whether he is caught or not, ordinarily 
grows up to be a respectable citizen, not at all alienated. With the Romantics it 
was different, for they were not vandalizing empty houses but rather the 
behavior-validating and -instructing rhetorical modes of European high culture, 
and the Romantics were cultural vandals, without exception. The explanatory 
collapse they had experienced was, after all, confined to them as, initially, 
individuals isolated from each other, but of course that explanation continued 
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all around them, and indeed continues in the bul!k: of the population to this day. 
That cultural vandalism, that all-encompassing negation of available high-level 
explanations and validations, is the behavior subsumed by the term "self'' as 
distinguished from "role." When Julien Sorel shoots Madame de Renal, Stendahl 
gives us one of the most powerful exemplifications of Romantic cultural 
vandalism. With this act Julien at last established his selfhood. The values and 
behavior of rthe "others" are judged to be those of individuals who have no self­
consciousness, who have experienced explanatory collapse because of their 
mindless inability to grasp the incoherence of their culture. They are not autono­
mous individuals, but players of social roles. Autonomy, therefore, is to be 
established by attacking those values and behaviors, by negation of their ex­
planatory and validatory sufficiency, that is, by alienation and cultural van­
dalism, the strategies by which selfhood is experienced. This tension between self 
and role, this continuous alienation and vandalism, is of course utterly anti­
erotic, and in this stage of Romantic emergence, which I long ago called Negative 
Romanticism, the Romantic hero is most often presented as incapable of love, 
incapable of resolving those tensions. Thus Julien Sorel's shooting of Madame de 
Renal is an anti-erotic act, as well as an anti-religious act, taking place in a 
church. Further, his subsequent symbolic isolation in prison leads to the next 
member of the Romantic family. 
The usual pattern of the modem humiliated individual who turns to sexual 
adventurism and to the cultural vandalism of his marriage is, once he has re­
established the sense of selfhood by means of aggressive sexuality 1 to return to 
his marriage and his family or to begin a new one. That is, he returns, like the 
adolescent vandal, to the socially validated behavioral patterns of his culture, 
to his role. But the Romantic had dismantled European explanatory culture. 
Once his selfhood had been established by alienation and vandalism, it was 
impossible for him to redeem himself by returning to the culture; even if, like 
Coleridge, he returned to Christianity, it was a new Christianity that he in­
vented himself. The truly Romantic alien could only innovate a new mode of 
escaping the tension of negation, autonomy, and vandalism, a tension increased 
by the continuous searching for a strategy to limit behavior and control decision­
making. His goal thus became necessarily a culturally transcendent redemption, 
which was giiven various names, the infinite, the blue flower, and so on. Thus it 
became necessary to sustain and if possible to increase his wandering and 
searching behavior. The solution for this problem lay in isolation. Here again I 
must make a step which I cannot explain here but can give only the behavioral 
principle itself. Culturally transmitted behavior is the overwhelming mass of 
human behavior, but any behavior pattern, such is the character of the brain, 
spreads into a delta-like pattern of deviation unless it is not only transmitted but 
continuously maintained by the repetition of cultural instructions. This process 
I call semiotic redundancy , the socio-cultural mechanism which sustains 
limitations on the range of behavior and thus channels it through time. It is not 
sufficient to learn a behavioral pattern; we must be told constantly to repeat it 
and how to repeat it. Further, the degree to which redundancy is effective 
depends upon the rate of interaction of the individual with other individuals. 
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The higher the interaction rate, the better behavior is limited and channelled, 
and the lower the interaction rate, the greater the randomization of behavior, 
the effect of the delta-like spread into deviancy. However, the greater the 
randomization of behavior the greater the statistical probability for the inno­
vation of a new and fruitful mode or pattern of behavior. The scientist whose 
theory fails him randomizes his behavior until he strikes on something which 
he.judges to be capable of fruitful development, and the higher the cultural level, 
the more frequent are social spaces for the randomization of behavior. Thus an 
extremely important member of the Romantic family is isolation, the steady 
reduction of the individual's interaction rate, the lowering of his rate of ex­
posure to redundant cultural instructions, and the statistical increase of the 
probability of an innovative response to even familiar utterances and artifacts. 
Thus the re-interpretation of age-old· utterances and artifactual signs is a con­
stant in the Romantic tradition, a factor indeed that makes the enterprise of the 
cultural historian of Romanticism so perplexing and the objects of his study 
filled with ambiguities. Hence social isolation is extraordinarily common in 
Romantic documents, both imaginary and biographical. Furthermore, so long as 
the alienated and culturally vandalizing autonomous individual maintains a 
high inrteraction rate, his condition continues to be one of behavioral limitation. 
What he encounters in his wanderings consists of negative redundancy. Hence as 
the Romantic seeks to resolve the tension of alienation, he turns to nature, not 
because of the presence of nature but because of the absence of man, and 
Romantic documents become increasingly full of instructions to reject familiar 
responses to stimulus configurations and to continue rejecting them until a fresh 
response occurs. The point is that a fresh , or completely deviant response, may 
possibly be exploited to produce a culturally transcendent mode of redemption 
from the tension of alienation and vandalism. 
B�fore proceeding to the final members of the Romantic family it is worth 
pausing to emphasize the historical importance of what I have called Roman­
ticism's negative phase. The pre·conditions of adaptationally and culturally 
fruitful innovation are explanatory collapse, alienation, autonomy, vandalism, 
low rate of interaction, and randomization of behavior. The cultural estab­
lishment of this discovery and its cultural preservation through literary and 
other documentary redundancy, as was artifactual redundancy, was possibly 
the most important innovation for which Romanticism was responsible. Its im­
portance lies in the fact that any society , any large-scale complex of inter­
related behavioral patterns maintained by redundancy and high interaction, is 
adaptationally inadequate to the degree its energy is chiefly expended on 
limiting the range of behavior to validated modes and patterns of behavior. This 
is the price of its survival. Nevertheless its survival also depends upon adap­
tationally appropriate innovative modifications of such patterns, that is, upon 
cultural transcendence. Until Romanticism only the socially stabilizing mode of 
survival had been socio-culturally organized and established in explanation and 
experientially. Romanticism, as the consequence of a uniquely severe explana­
tory trauma, discovered the second principle of social survival, which has always 
been in existence of course, but before Romanticism had not been socio-
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culturaJly organized and establ ished. This is one of the two reasons I have for 
judging that we still live in the Romantic period, or rather, that a small but 
highly important segment of explanatory culture and its exemplification in art is 
Romantic and has not been transcended, though it has appeared in innumerable 
forms and an enormous variety of metamorphoses. The second reason for this 
judgment is the character of the redemptive modes the Romantic tradition has 
innovated, and above all the internal incoherence of those modes which has 
given the Romantic tradition its extraordinary dynamism, its high rate of 
cultural change. 
For the Romantic, then, whose explanatory collapse was severe and traumatic, 
there was no return. Radical explanatory innovation was the only possibility, 
and even though he might reject explanation and ·Lum to an experiential or non­
verbal mode of fusion of subject and object, a mode that foll owing the model of 
Kant became known as the aesthetic mode of apprehension, still even that was 
explained and justified in language, in verbal behavior. As 1 have suggested, non­
verbal redemptive response is not significantly different from verbal. Both are 
modes of reducing or eliminating the tension between subject and object, 
between sensory input and semiotic response. Further, this kind of aesthetic 
response can be culturally maintained either by language or by observation and 
imitation of behavioral paradigms, as in Oriental religious institutions and 
traditions. For Romanticism, however, lacking such institutions, the establish­
ment and propagation of this aesthetic ideology depended upon verbal redun­
dancy. Though it was not a response to verbal explanation, nevertheless it was a 
response to verbal explanation as instructions for a particular mode of behavior. 
Hence throughout the history of Romanticism to the present there has been 
considerable confusion and difficulty, since it is exceedingly difficult, except 
for a few temperaments, to experience such a response with the help of only 
verbal directions and to be certain one has indeed had the experience the 
language has directed one to have. Further, once the ineffable and indesctj.bable 
experience has been attained, the temptation to explain it and justify it verbally 
is so powerful it becomes or is judged to be a necessity, since it was a negation 
of non-Romantic explanatory traditions, still omnipresent in tthe culture. As a 
response to an explanatory collapse, it required an explanatory justificatio n. 
Otherwise it could not negate those non-Romantic traditilons. Thus it is 
reasonable lo put the principal emphasis on emergent or innovative Romantic 
explanations, the explanatory cultural transcendence of Romanticism. 
In Blake's remark that he must create his own syslem or be subject to 
another man's and in his mythological poems it is apparent that innovative ex­
planation maintains the sense of selfhood, a perpetuation necessary for cultural 
transcendence and to perpetuate in the face of what it negates in the culture, 
which is almost everything of an explanatory character. Yet Blake's effort is a 
very primitive example of such transcendence, for his elaborate mythology was 
little more than the exemplification of a neo-Platonic and Hermetic redemptive 
explanation, regressive to the 16th century. It was a mythologically concealed 
return to an already existent and available mode of verbal redemption. Con­
sequently the tendency in the study of Romanticism in the past few decades to 
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take Blake as a model Romantic has been responsible for a serious distortion of 
Romanticism and for an emphasis upon the Romantic innovation of redemptive 
explanations. One group of Romantics, right up to the present, has responded to 
explanatory collapse by generating innovative explanations. But another group 
and another tradition has done something quite different. The two traditions, 
the incoherence between which has been the source of the extraordinary inno­
vative dynamism of the Romantic tradition, can be presented in the form of two 
questions: one, "Redemptive explanations having failed, what new redemptive 
explanation can I create?", the other, "Redemptive explanation having failed, 
how can I create an anti-redemptive explanation, an anti-explanatory explana­
tion?" One, "What new explanation will suffice?" The other, "Why do men 
create explanations?" 
The first question and the answers to it were controlled by the over­
whelming powerful European and indeed human tradition, emerging at least 
since the beginning of the Neolithic and probably before, that the human goal is 
properly redemption and that its highest verbal goal is properly a redemptive ex­
planation, in short, Paradise. This resulted in what is often called the apocalyp. 
tic Romantic tradition, and the identification of Romanticism with the search 
for the apocalyptic, a search which is after all quite easily satisfied, has given us 
only one part and that the more historically regressive part of Romanticism. 
After all, the overwhelming part of human culture is aimed at the reduction of 
tension, and in particular the reduction, such is the nature of language and the 
rest of semiotic behavior, of epistemological and ontological tension, its 
reduction and ideally its elimination. Thus it is not surprising that redemptive 
or apocalyptic Romanticism should have occurred, nor is it any more sur­
prising that scholars, subject to the enormous cultural innovations and distur­
banc�s of the 20th century, should respond by an interest in it. The scholarly 
and critical interest in apocalyptic Romanticism, especially during the socio­
cultural disturbances of the 1960's, is itself a redemptive response, a repetition, 
since the dominating high culture of the United States is almost pure Enlighten­
ment, of what the apocalyptic Romantics themselves underwent. But this also 
explains the intense interest the mythological modes of Romantic apocalypticism. 
In early human history, so far as we can understand it at all, on the basis of 
pitifully few records, themselves involving dreadful hermeneutic problems, 
mythology was most likely the first stage of an explanatory regress from the 
observable. I think Comte was probably right in that. However, modem 
mythology, aware that it is mythology, is an effort to resolve the inadequacy 
of abstract explanation by masking it in exemplary language. This accounts I 
think for the notes of hysteria and sentimentality so often found in the writing 
of those scholars who insist that the heart of Romanticism is a mythology of 
apocalyptic redemption. For the real issue of the explanatory collapse ·at· the 
end of the 18th century of Platonic-Christian idealism, of Baconian-Enlighten­
ment empiricism, and of skepticism itself, is that explanation itself collapsed. 
Hence, the question, Why do men create explanations? 
The first great answer was Hegel's, although Senancour anticipated much of 
what was to come, as did the Schiller in his last period. To Hegel the category 
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of Being is empty. An explanation of Being is not derived from Being but is 
the Geist's, that is, culture's response to Being. The validity of that response 
must rest upon the Absolute, but when at the end of the Phenomenology the 
Absolute is achieved, il lurns out to be as emply a category as Being. The only 
thing to do is to go back to Being and start all over again, though this time with 
the Spirit's conscious awareness of what it is doing. Men create explanations 
because explanalion is the condition of their existence, but even so it is only 
an instrument for sustaining that existence. An explanation is to be found only 
in the acceptance of the impossibility of redemption. There is no resolution of 
the tension o f  subject and object, for the tension between sensory stimulus and 
semiotic response. A splendid modem example of this position is to be found in 
Wallace Stevens' "The Well Dressed Man with a Beard." After a marvelous 
evocation o f  tension resolution, of Paradise, o f  affirmation following upon 
negation, he suddenly breaks off and writes, "It can never be satisfied, the 
mind, never." An explanation is a supreme fiction. When we weary of the 
imagination, we turn to the necessary angel, reality. 
I would not deny that apocalyptic Romanticism, redemptive Romanticism, 
explanatory Romanticism, was indeed Romanticism, but rather I would assert 
that it was the historically regressive mode of Romanticism, responding to 
explanatory collapse by innovating culturally transcendent explanations. And I 
would also assert that compared with anti-redemptive, anti-explanatory Roman­
ticism it was relatively superficial, for in contrast this subtler Romanticism 
recognized that the explanatory collapse which was the cultural trauma that 
precipitated Romanticism was the collapse of explanation itself. It was the 
fundamental incoherence of. these two modes of Romantic response to cultural 
trauma that has been responsible for the astonishing culturally innovative 
dynamism o f  high explanatory culture and its artistic exemplification for the 
pasl 180 years. For nearly two centuries various modes of redemption have been 
innovaled, most of which still remain with us, social redemption, as with the 
various forms of socialism as well as Marxism, erotic redemption, scientific 
redemption, redemption by means of art, redemption by means o f  sex, the 
most widespread mode today, since it has the greatest potential for popular 
appeal and even sacred texts, the monthly issues of Playboy, redemption 
through Oriental mysticism, redemption by means of drugs, even redemption by 
means of radical re-interpretations of the rhetoric of Christian theology, as with 
Coleridge and how many others. However, avant-garde artists today are busily 
engaged in a self-conscious destruction of art, but arl can scarcely be destroyed, 
since it is an adaptational strategy. Rather, what they are engaged in destroying 
is what remains the most potent redemptive mode for the redemptively inclined 
members of high culture, lhe redemptive notion of art. Art having been used as a 
fortress from which to negate the adequacy of the traditional and the 19th- and 
20th-century innovative modes of redemption, that fortress can itself be de­
stroyed. As this happens, I think we will see in the scholarship of Romanticism a 
turning away from the still fashionable limitation of Romanticism to its relative­
ly superficial apocalyptic or redemptive mode, and a turning towards its more 
penetrating tradition, the anti-explanatory, the an ti-redemptive, the refusal t-0 
accept any consolation for the irresolvable tension of human existence. 
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